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Abstract
Cyber attacks on Critical National Infrastructure (CNI)
can be hugely detrimental to society, notably via compro-
mising Industrial Control Systems (ICS) that underpin core
CNI functions. In order to explore in-depth ICS Cyber Se-
curity challenges, testbeds are an essential tool, avoiding the
need to experiment exclusively on live systems. However,
ICS testbed creation is a complex multidisciplinary challenge,
with a plethora of conflicting requirements. This paper, based
on over six years of ICS testbed research and development that
spans multiple diverse applications, proposes a flexible high-
level model that can be adopted to support ICS testbed devel-
opment. This is complemented by a baseline set of practical
implementation guidance incorporating related and emerging
technologies. As a collective, the model and implementation
guidance offers a go-to guide for a wide range of end-users.
Furthermore, it provides a coherent foundational structure to-
wards establishing an online "living" resource, which can be
expanded over time through broader community engagement.
1 Introduction
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) underpin operational pro-
cesses responsible for the safe continued operation of indus-
trial facilities, some of which are classified as Critical National
Infrastructure (CNI) (e.g. water and energy) [55].
To better understand the complex construct of ICSs, the Pur-
due Enterprise Reference Architecture (commonly referred
to as the "Purdue Model") [123] is often employed to provide
a high-level view of fundamental features, separated into dis-
tinct zones. Cisco’s enhanced version of the Purdue Model
breaks down ICSs into four zones: A Safety Zone to manage
safety functions; a Manufacturing Zone to monitor, control,
and automate operational processes; a Demilitarised Zone
providing a buffer between the Manufacturing Zone and En-
terprise Zone; and finally an Enterprise Zone providing IT
services and access to operational data via the Demilitarised
Zone [21].
Cyber attacks targeting ICS manufacturing zones can result
in widespread CNI service disruption [41], with risk to hu-
man life amplified through the targeting of safety zones [48].
Therefore, attacks targeting ICSs, via increasing numbers of
component vulnerabilities and exploits, presents a significant
concern [50]. While this is recognised by ICS operators, with
over three quarters surveyed believing attackers are very or
quite likely to target core operations, only 23% are compliant
with baseline security guidance/regulations [94].
Although legal requirements have been introduced as a
mechanism to improve the cyber security posture of CNI,
research is required towards the continued development of
defensive techniques, providing a feedback loop into rele-
vant supporting standards/guidelines [73]. However, the use
of real-world facilities to conduct research is limited due to
the impact that such activities could have on operational pro-
cesses [40]. Therefore, the use of testbeds is required. We
use the term "testbed" to encompass all forms of environmen-
tal replication, including simulated, emulated, and physically
replicated environments.
ICS testbeds fulfil a wide range of requirements, including
research, proof-of-concepting, cyber exercising, and threat
intelligence, across varying degrees of size and complexity.
Through existing academic and industry engagement in this
space, we have designed and built multiple ICS testbed en-
vironments to support these requirements. While existing
research, including that of our own [37, 39, 40, 80], offers in-
sight into the design and build of testbeds, it does not provide
a clear, high-level model, accompanied by options for practi-
cal implementation, as a single go-to guide spanning a range
of requirements. This paper targets such deficiencies through
the identification of fundamental design considerations, and
the introduction of a flexible, high-level model for ICS cyber
security testbed design.
In order to take our model and deliver a testbed that sup-
ports end-user requirements, we include a baseline set of
practical implementation options with supporting references.
However, as it is not possible to provide a complete overview
of all technical implementation options within a single pub-
lication, an incomplete picture is formed that will lose value
over time. Therefore, to bolster the supporting technical im-
plementation surrounding our model, we propose an online
"living" resource, used to aggregate all practical implementa-
tion options we have applied to date. Furthermore, this acts
as a foundation towards the creation of a community space
which can evolve over time, with input from others who have
developed ICS testbeds, thus overcoming the limitations of a
single publication.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 discusses related work. Section 3 outlines design con-
siderations. Section 4 posits our high-level testbed model.
Section 5 provides baseline options for the practical imple-
mentation of our model. Section 6 details the concept of our
"living" resource. Section 7 concludes the paper and discusses
areas for future work.
2 Related Work
Related work within this space is typically formulated around
three themes: surveys, theoretical concepts, and focused ex-
ample implementations.
Our early work explored the field of ICS risk manage-
ment [56]. A key finding highlighted challenges in applied
methodologies, often lacking empirical evidence, described as
a result of researchers’ inability to access real-world data. This
has resulted in the use of testbeds, a review of which revealed
a broad mix of implementations. In a subsequent review of
smart grid testbeds, Cintuglu et al., [17] identified one third
were developed with a cyber security focus. Holm et al., [44]
analysed multiple implementation approaches (virtualisation,
simulation, emulation, and hardware) and device coverage.
Where as Wu and Kobara [125] focused on challenges aligned
to the use of simulation-based approaches alone. Finally, our
more recent work examined the use of testbeds, their imple-
mentation, and evaluation processes, to extract a set of design
considerations [6].
While surveys help us understand adopted approaches, they
are presented at a high-level, offering little in the way of
guidance to support practical testbed development. Work pre-
senting conceptual viewpoints begins to address this issue.
Christiansson and Luiijf [15] discussed the concept of a Euro-
pean ICS security testbed from multiple perspectives (strategy,
potential problems, end requirements, etc.). Our foundational
work [39, 80] defined key concepts for ICS testbed design,
centralised around flexibility, credibility, reliability, and diver-
sity. Design considerations have been discussed by Joonsoo
et al., [54] for cyber exercise testbeds, and Maynard et al., for
experimental testbeds [62]. These are comparable to our more
recent work [40], extended by Craggs et al., [28] to produce
a reference architecture. Alternative reference architectures
have also been proposed by Kavallieratos et al., [52] and Gi-
ani et al., [38]. Rigid concepts based on how the authors have
developed their own facilities can result in a lack of depth,
and offer limited details for practical implementation. From
our experience, a form of tunnel vision can emerge, resulting
in discussion aligned to a single approach.
Work focusing on implementation typically aligns to spe-
cific approaches, also resulting in a narrow viewpoint [29].
Focusing on large-scale deployments are little more than
aspirational for most, with insufficient detail for end-to-end
replication [61]. The use of network diagrams, associated
devices, protocols, etc., begin to bridge the gap, however
they are highly rigid [11]. This is reflected in our previous
work [37, 40], where details were provided within the context
of lessons learnt and aligned to a network diagram, presenting
a challenge if used as a sole reference.
The existing work described in this section is largely lim-
ited due to its focus on rigid theoretical concepts and highly
focused implementations. The remainder of this paper will
leverage existing resources one should consult prior to the
use of our flexible, high-level model. Our model will be com-
plemented with a set of baseline implementation options, and
the introduction of an online living resource, aiding in the
practical development of testbeds to meet end-user require-
ments. Collectively, this will address the challenges identified
across existing work, and better support the security commu-
nity towards the continued development and evolution of ICS
testbeds.
3 Design Considerations
ICS testbed development can be complex. It is therefore essen-
tial to clearly define and follow a set of design considerations
aligned to specific end-user requirements, while remaining
mindful of how such requirements may change over time.
Existing work details a broad selection of design consid-
erations [37, 39, 40, 62, 80]. However our recent survey [6]
offers the most comprehensive overview to date. This work
provides a set of characteristics (see Table 1) one should con-
sider when outlining testbed objectives (TBO), architecture
(TBA), and/or evaluation process (TBE).









Repeatability/Reproducibility X X X
Measurability&Measurement Accuracy X X
Cost-effectiveness X X X
Isolation/Safe Execution X X
Usability X X
Complexity X
Table 1: Testbed Characteristics
The value placed on each characteristic should be driven by
end-user requirements. For example, the UK Office for Nu-
clear Regulation [111] provides a set of security assessment
principles [110] operators must incorporate into their systems
and processes. This involves a requirement for exercising
established processes, using live scenarios where practical.
Dependent upon exercise aims, developing a comprehensive
testbed across each characteristic may not be necessary. For
example, where the focus of an exercise is aligned to human
response, a testbed’s fidelity requirements would typically be
lower than an exercise focusing on the use of security tooling.
As a research tool, the diversity of systems, for example,
becomes less of a concern when undertaking research on
devices from a single vendor [47]. Compared to monitoring
and logging capability, of utmost importance providing data
capture capabilities for further analysis [97].
Industry based proof-of-concept/system trials [81], as with
testbeds for research purposes, can be highly focused. The
implementation/testing of an intrusion detection/prevention
system (IDS/IPS) supporting a selection of industrial proto-
cols, for example. This could dictate a requirement for the
diversity of equipment to generate network traffic, while in-
creasing fidelity by avoiding simulation techniques.
Threat intelligence, as demonstrated by a recent Honeypot
implementation [43], further highlights the importance of
building upon relevant characteristics. This work focused
heavily on fidelity, in an attempt to attract real-worlds threat
actors. The addition of broad interoperability and modularity,
for example, would not have provided significant benefits
given this defined objective.
The characteristics listed here should be reviewed as an
initial step in forming an understanding of testbed design
requirements. The following section introduces our flexible,
high-level model, used to provide a stepping stone from de-
sign requirements to practical implementation.
4 High-Level Model
Work on ICS testbeds to date has focused on the design and
implementation of specific architectural or device-level con-
structs. While this provides value, it is often too rigid and
narrow in focus to support broader goals, differing levels of
technical expertise, varying budgets, etc. This section intro-
duces our high-level model, abstracted from rigid architec-
tures, much the same way as the Purdue Model abstracts from
real-world ICS deployments.
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of our model.
As an abstract resource, its use is non-prescriptive, supporting
the understanding and selection of appropriate features to de-
liver against testbed requirements. The following subsections
describe each of the model’s five layers. These layers are
supported by a safety and security wraparound, representing
a key requirement for any testbed, ensuring end-user safety is
upheld, and the testbed is protected from unauthorised access
and disruption. The Cyber Security Experiment Lifecycle [70]
and its four core elements (Design, Instantiation, Execution,
and Analysis) will be used to augment layer descriptions.
Figure 1: High-Level Model
Figure 2: Model Breakdown
4.1 Management Layer
The Management Layer acts as central point from which
oversight of a testbed can be established. This includes
general functionality, from server management to network
management, but extends to include the safety and security
wraparound. Experiment Instantiation and Execution is par-
tially covered by this layer. For example, management access
to a hypervisor [122] can be used to deploy virtual machines
within the Experimental Layer as per experiment Design re-
quirements. If deployed in isolation from other layers as per
our model, a clear demarcation between usable infrastructure
and operational oversight can be established, meaning man-
agement activities are undertaken in complete isolation from
experiment activities. However, this may not be practical in
smaller deployments.
4.2 User Layer
The User Layer presents an opportunity to centralise and
manage a set of resources, which testbed users may require
to support experiment Design, and to capture and Analyse
experiment data. The functionality of this layer can be viewed
as the management of experiment tooling and systems with
visibility over/access to the Experimental Layer. Therefore,
experiment Instantiation and Execution are also supported
by this layer through access into the Experimental Layer via
the Infrastructure Bridge. For example, this could include
accessing Experimental Layer devices, configuring, enabling,
and orchestrating (Executing) their operation as per experi-
ment Design requirements. This layer may take many forms,
particularly in smaller deployments.
4.3 Infrastructure Bridge
The Infrastructure Bridge provides a network infrastructure
to control the flow of data between the User Layer and the
Experimental Layer, supporting experimental Instantiation
and Execution from the User Layer. This can be of benefit
when conducting high-risk research within the Experimental
Layer, limiting the spread of malicious artefacts onto User
Layer systems.
4.4 Experimental Layer
Forming the core element of any ICS testbed is the Experimen-
tal Layer, where all ICS components are deployed supporting
experiment Instantiation and Execution as per associated De-
sign requirements. Considering the Purdue Model as a high-
level representation of ICS components, the Experimental
Layer is where these are deployed. In addition to ICSs, we
also consider related and emerging technologies encroach-
ing into the ICS space. This includes Building Management
Systems (BMS) and the Internet of Things (IoT). As this
model is designed to support cyber security testbed design,
additional related systems may also be required here, Security
Operations Centres (SOC) for example.
4.5 Remote Access Layer
Based on the size and access requirements, a Remote Access
Layer can be implemented accommodating interconnectivity
for external Experimental Layers (e.g. partner organisations,
mobile facilities, and remote worker simulation), external
User Layer access, and remote Management Layer access,
supporting all elements of the experiment lifecycle. Where
one may participate in a larger federated set of testbeds be-
tween a group of partnering organisations, it could be that
our model is singular, with remote external experimental plat-
forms all managed within one holistic environment. Alterna-
tively, each member may operate every layer of our model
independently, and share Experimental Layer resources.
4.6 Summary
With the exception of the Experimental Layer, not all of the
aforementioned model layers will be required within every
testbed, much like each level of the Purdue Model and real-
world ICS deployments. This is an important point to note,
with the subsequent section applying our model as a founda-
tion, and detailing specific attributes one can align to each
layer should they be required.
To provide a bridge between our model and baseline prac-
tical implementation details, Figure 2 has been created to
depict optional building blocks one may wish to consider
implementing across each layer within the model. Here you
can also see how the practical management of a safety and
security wraparound falls within the scope of the manage-
ment layer. As with the general management of core testbed
elements, overarching safety and security properties should
remain largely invisible to testbed users.
5 Baseline Practical Implementation
The following subsections take our model layers and con-
stituent building blocks from Figure 2, to offer baseline prac-
tical implementation options. As discussed in Section 2, exist-
ing work providing details towards practical implementation
techniques are highly focused on how the authors have built
their own facilities. Here, we take existing academic work,
commercial products, open-source tooling, programming li-
braries, personal experience, etc. to offer a broad range of
practical implementation options, spanning all model layers.
As discussed across the previous sections, the practical
implementation guidance provided here offers a baseline, and
is structurally aligned the model breakdown in Figure 2. This
provides a starting point towards the practical development of
an ICS testbed, but more importantly, demonstrates the type
of information an online living resource could contain, this
will be discussed further in Section 6.
Due to the practical nature of this section, we have also
created Figure 3 depicting an example network architecture
aligned to our model. As with Figure 2, this is included to
stimulate and support discussion. This is not a mandated prac-
tical application of the model. Additional practical network
architectures for ICS environments can be found in documen-
tation by NIST [107] and Kaspersky Labs [51].
Figure 3: Example ICS Testbed Network Architecture
5.1 Management Layer
The following section details practical implementation tech-
niques for elements within the Management Layer. When
developing this layer it is important to consider all elements
that underpin the testbed, and how they can be managed in
isolation from other layers.
5.1.1 User Access Control
The Management Layer underpins all testbed capability. As
such, user access control forms a critical component, allowing
authorised testbed managers to make changes supporting user
requirements at a physical and virtual level.
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [127] via
Microsoft’s Active Directory (AD) [30], can be used as a cen-
tralised point for authentication with physical or virtualised
computational resources [116], network devices [19], etc.
For physical access control, one can refer to guidance pro-
vided by CPNI [27].
5.1.2 Computational Resource Management
The implementation of desktop and server based instances,
running across each layer of a testbed, can be physical or
virtual. As per Figure 3, the management layer could be de-
ployed as a single network zone with all physical devices
connected allowing for wide-spread access.
Where virtualisation is adopted, a single physical host run-
ning numerous virtual hosts will be established. A dedicated
network interface must be allocated for setup/ongoing man-
agement. Taking vSphere (ESXI) [122] as an example, should
an environment require more than one physical host, vCen-
tre [119] can be used to centrally manage all vSphere in-
stances. vSphere and vCentre also provides APIs for the de-
velopment of custom tooling [121].
Non-virtualised physical deployments may require a dedi-
cated network interface, with an appropriate service enabling
system-level access. This could be something as simple as
RDP [63] or SSH [64].
Broader server and infrastructure monitoring tools includ-
ing Splunk [105] may also provide benefits for larger deploy-
ments.
5.1.3 Network Resource Management
When accessing independent network devices, a dedicated
network interface for use on the management layer could be
adopted. Alternatively an IP to console server may be more
cost-effective and prevent unwanted bridging [75].
The use of VLANs offers multiple benefits, particularly
in virtualised environments [120]. Network connections can
be passed via a centralised switch, collecting all VLANs and
feeding them via a single trunk to a virtualisation server/s.
The use of a centralised switch also provides a single point of
contact to isolate network zones, supports the ability to switch
between a physical and SDN based implementation [59], es-
tablish mirrored data feeds from specific ports [20], etc.
Building a digital twin of the network infrastructure using
tools such as Packet Tracer [23] can support change manage-
ment processes. In addition, general networking monitoring
tools including Nagios [72] may also provide value.
We have also included a Hand-Off router in Figure 3. This
could be used to manage all external connectivity, with well
structured static routing [22], access control lists [24], intru-
sion detection/prevention (IDS/IPS) [13], etc. The separation
between a public facing router managing encrypted external
connectivity, and the non-encrypted internal network, allows
for a greater level of visibility into traffic flows (IPs, ports,
protocols, etc.) for a IDS/IPS to analyse.
5.1.4 Process and Safety
A set of devices and processes may be required to feed Ex-
perimental Layer systems with data. The use of these must
be controlled, ensuring users are safe from physical harm at
all times. Mandating testbed users undertake basic electrical
safety training [108], follow wiring recommendations includ-
ing power separation [88], and encase all live equipment in
suitable panels [106], can act as a starting point supporting
this critical requirements.
Out-of-loop safety systems, with a security wraparound
(see Section 5.1.5) preventing unauthorised command exe-
cution between systems could also be employed, much the
same as real-world safety systems [84, 85]. Additional for-
mal guidance is available in related standards, including ISO
62061 [10].
The use of remote resources should be conducted under a
strict set of procedures agreed between both parties. Cameras
may also add value, providing a secondary verification of
process states. This can be summarised as a holistic socio-
technical view, with blended safety and security controls.
5.1.5 Security Monitoring
With the Management Layer acting as a gate-keeper to all
testbed resources, security monitoring falls within its scope,
ensuring testbed compromise by unauthorised persons is not
realised, and experimentation is appropriately isolated. Con-
cepts used in the development of a Security Operations Centre
(SOC) within the Experimental Layer could be applied here
(see Section 5.5.4).
5.2 Infrastructure Bridge Layer
This layer performs one task, supporting connectivity between
the User Layer, and the Experimental Layer. Using Figure 3
as an example, this can be as simple as including one router
and subnet onto which devices in both layers connect. In prac-
tical terms, this means a workstation in the User Layer will
have two interfaces, one in the User Layer network, the other
in the Infrastructure Bridge Layer network. Likewise, a work-
station in the Experimental Layer will have two interfaces,
one in an Experimental Layer network, the other in the Infras-
tructure Bridge Layer network. This is where Experimental
Layer networks can be complex; it is essential that the devices
communicate with one another over their respective experi-
mental network subnets, rather than over the Infrastructure
Bridge network. This can be managed through the introduc-
tion of local firewalls permitting connectivity with user layer
devices only [65, 115]. Further complexity and additional
networking components could be added to the Infrastructure
Bridge Layer, to manage User Layer access to Experimental
Layer resources beyond the baseline described here.
5.3 User Layer
The following subsections provide a breakdown of each ele-
ment within the User Layer. When developing this layer, it
is important to consider all elements and tooling that testbed
users may require to conduct their work, reducing the need for
additional bolt-on systems and services which could impact
the testbeds overall manageability.
5.3.1 Workstations
Including workstations (physical or virtual) in a User Layer
allows for the integration of all supporting hardware and soft-
ware as a centralised resource pool. These workstations could
be Windows or Linux based, dependent upon requirements.
For example, the Kali Linux distribution [96] comes pre-built
with a number of tools that testbed users may require. Ad-
ditional tools could include network analysis [124], script-
ing [87], reverse engineering [2], debugging [67], and ICS
vendor software [102].
5.3.2 User Access Control
The use of physical and virtual workstations within the User
Layer allows for scalability and the integration of local ex-
perimental devices (see Section 5.3.7), storage, data capture
points, etc. User access control to these resources is critical,
particularly where parallel activities may be under way across
the Experimental Layer. The approaches described within
Section 5.1.1 are applicable here, centralising the manage-
ment of resources based on user profiles.
5.3.3 Jump Box
Jump boxes represent a central point from which system users
access the Experimental Layer via the Infrastructure Bridge
Layer (with a network interface sitting on each network as
described in Section 5.2). Authentication with a jump box via
approaches described in Section 5.1.1 would also be appro-
priate here.
5.3.4 Storage
The data generated by user experiments may require substan-
tial storage capacity. While user workstations (physical or
virtual) may have sufficient internal capacity, data manage-
ment is key. The approaches described within Section 5.1.1
can be used to manage resources on a user-by-user basis.
Additional storage can be implemented through the use of
external devices, with platforms such as vSphere affording
seamless integration of iSCSI devices [117] and network at-
tached storage [118].
5.3.5 Network Data Capture
Network data capture is typically achieved through the use of
network mirrors/spans. Section 5.1.3 described the use of a
centralised network switch. Implementing an approach such
as this, where every network connection passes through a
centralised switch, allows all associated traffic to be captured.
Where switches reside beyond the core network, within each
field site for example (see Section 5.5.1), having them feed
back to a centralised switch would also offer significant value.
In order to provide ease of access to mirrored/span traffic,
VLANS can be used. Aligning each link to a specific VLAN
and trunking it to a centralised location, such as vSphere,
allows for User Layer workstations to be mapped to spe-
cific VLANS, affording visibility of all associated traffic with
appropriate tooling (e.g. Wireshark [124]). This supports a
critical requirement of testbed users in the analysis of holistic
network traffic. Furthermore, this traffic can also be fed into
SOC systems (see Section 5.5.4).
5.3.6 Process Data Capture
The ability to access data from operational processes deployed
across the Experimental Layer from the User Layer, may be
required to validate results seen directly within the Exper-
imental Layer itself. Using software defined radio (SDR)
technologies, researchers can capture radio traffic from wire-
less sensor network devices (see Section 5.3.7). This can be
used in collaboration with network data captures (see Sec-
tion 5.3.5) to validate operational process sates. The use of
cameras to monitor physical operational processes can also
further validation efforts. In addition, a more comprehensive
option would be to deploy secondary sensors and controllers
within the User Layer, providing a guaranteed view of op-
erational process states where Experimental Layer devices
are under attack. Should an out-of-loop safety system be de-
ployed as part of the Management Layer (see Section 5.1.4),
exporting its data for use in the User Layer could present an
alternate option.
5.3.7 Local Experimental Devices
In order to capture certain data types, or interact with aspects
of the Experimental Layer, particularly with wireless tech-
nologies, testbed users will need to implement additional,
specialised hardware. This could include SDR, WiFi, Blue-
tooth, and Infra-Red. For example, a Blade RF [74] could be
deployed in the User Layer to support SDR capabilities.
5.4 Remote Access Layer
Figure 3 provides an example of integrating external con-
nectivity with a testbed environment. Here a single, public
facing router is depicted, which would be used to aggregate
all external connectivity into the testbed. This router could
act as a traditional, centralised VPN connection point for
all external connectivity, adopting a "hub-and-spoke" archi-
tecture [18]. Alternatively, a single tunnel to a centralised
platform such as Perimeter 81 [1] can be used to managed all
external connectivity. In this model, Perimeter 81 acts as the
public facing entry point into the testbed, supporting static
VPN and desktop-based client connectivity models.
Figure 3 also includes a hand-off router; this can be used
to introduce an additional layer between external and inter-
nal systems, with an open link between it and the public
facing router (non-encrypted traffic that can be analysed by
an IDS/IPS system). In this example, the hand-off would
be responsible for access into each testbed layer. Access to
the Management Layer represents the greatest risk, where an
additional level of authentication between the hand-off and
management router may be required. For external user access,
directly reachable devices could be limited to User Layer
workstations. Experimental Layer access can become more
complicated dependent upon requirements. Figure 3 provides
three example paths, one as a simulated user (mimicking a
real-world operator of the ICS infrastructure), one as a remote
field site (providing an entire external network of systems),
and one as a single remote device being introduced into an
existing area of the network.
5.5 Experimental Layer
The following subsections provide a breakdown of each ele-
ment within the experimental layer. Figure 3 provides a more
comprehensive picture of how the replicated ICS infrastruc-
ture could look, acting as an additional example reference
point throughout this section.
5.5.1 ICS
When developing core ICS elements of the Experimental
Layer, an appropriate network architecture should be selected,
onto which appropriate devices and software packages can
be deployed. Resources including NIST 800-82 [107] can be
referenced for practical examples of ICS architectures found
in real-world environments. An additional example of this
can be seen in Figure 3, where a selection of network zones
have been defined.
While each operational ICS deployment is unique, adopted
hardware and software is similar, varying in scale and
complexity to meet operational requirements. To support our
discussion, examples are provided spanning core zones within
the previously described "extended" Purdue Model [21], with
the Manufacturing Zone and Demilitarised Zone grouped
for simplicity. In Figure 3 the "Local/Remote FS" networks
represent geographically dispersed field sites (water treatment
works, pumping stations, etc.) that form the foundation
of any Manufacturing Zone, the "Operational Technology
(OT)" networks represent elements of the Manufacturing
Zone and Demilitarised Zone, and the "Information Technol-
ogy (IT)" networks represent elements of the Enterprise Zone.
Manufacturing Zone and Demilitarised Zone: The physi-
cal operational process resides at the lowest level of an ICS.
There are two primary options for process replication, physi-
cal and virtual. A physical self-build can be conducted based
on existing documented approaches [89]. Alternatively, two
off-the-shelf options are available: large scale processes that
operate in the same way as real-world systems [42], or mini
replication kits [35]. Simulated options are available both
commercially [32] and as open-sourced projects [36], or can
be self developed through the use of communications libraries
supporting common industrial protocols [71].
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) and Remote Ter-
minal Units (RTU) represent the heart of manufacturing zone
activities, providing direct interaction with operational pro-
cesses delivering monitoring, control, and automation capa-
bility. Physical devices can be procured from leading vendors
including Rockwell [91] . Some also offer starter kits with all
relevant supporting configuration software and Human Ma-
chine Interfaces (HMIs) [99]. Alternatively, commercial PLC
simulation software is available [103], or the aforementioned
library [71] could be used to self develop a simulated con-
troller, with the option of physical I/O through microcontroller
development boards/single board computers [7].
HMIs used to monitor and control operational processes
via PLCs are bundled within starter kits. They can also be
procured separately in a range of sizes from leading vendors
including Rockwell [90] . Within larger-scale deployments
these devices are replaced with desktop-based software alter-
natives [101]. The aforementioned library could also be used
to self develop a HMI [71].
Historian software used to collect data for analytical pur-
poses is available from leading vendors, including Kep-
ware [53] . Once again, the aforementioned libraries could
be used to self develop a historian [71], with the addition of
supplementary libraries supporting protocols for connectivity
with datacentre/cloud based systems (e.g. OPC [79] ).
When considering data-centre based environments aggre-
gating data from multiple field sites, commercial solutions are
available from leading vendors, including Schneider [31], that
may also include demo licensing options. Open sourced op-
tions are also available, including RapidSCADA [93] . Mov-
ing into the IoT/IIoT space, products from Thingworx [86]
offer additional benefits, such as cloud-based operation, and
increased interconnectivity with a wider variety of devices,
such as those noted in Section 5.5.3. Finally, as with the afore-
mentioned examples, existing libraries can be used to self
develop systems of this nature [71, 79].
In addition to the ICS focused packages described here,
the inclusion of more generic network and user management
systems discussed across previous sections could also
be deployed. Security monitoring capability forms an
additional key consideration, see Section 5.5.4 for related
implementation details.
Enterprise Zone: The Enterprise Zone largely contains
common IT-based system, from general user workstations,
to email servers [68], file share servers [69], and update
servers [66]. However, the inclusion of bespoke software pack-
ages to interface with Demilitarised Zone systems may also
required. For example, a mirror of Schneider’s ClearSCADA
platform could be deployed in the Demilitarised Zone (iso-
lated away from broader field-site connectivity utilised by
a primary ClearSCADA server) to provide Enterprise Zone
access to operational data. This platform can be accessed via
a web-interface, or with a client application [31]. In addition,
the inclusion of Internet connectivity within this zone would
be common in real-world scenarios. Where direct connectiv-
ity to the Internet is less desirable, simulated alternatives are
available [45]. As with the Demilitarised Zone, the inclusion
of generic network, user management, and security systems
discussed throughout this paper could also be deployed here.
5.5.2 BMS
BMSs are traditionally abstracted and divided into 3 zones:
the Field Zone, the Automation Zone, and the Management
Zone [16]. We use these three zones to breakdown discussions
here. As previously described, BMSs are related to ICS,
therefore may be of interest to testbed users. Both BMS and
IoT systems could be deployed in a single isolated network
zone, or become fully integrated into core ICS elements of
the Experimental Layer.
Field Zone: This zone is where physical elements under the
BMSs control reside. These include Heating Ventilation
and Air Conditioning (HVAC), lighting, fire and smoke
detection, and access control. Physical elements can be
deployed as large-scale real-world systems [33], scaled
down replications [34], or simulated using field-level
communication protocol libraries [83] used to communicate
with Automation Zone devices.
Automation Zone: Controllers form the core component of
this zone, providing an interface to monitor, control, and
automate operational processes, similar to PLCs and RTUs
in ICSs. Physical devices can be procured from leading
vendors such as Trend Controls [112]. Some ICS vendors
also provide BMS-specific devices, including Siemens [100] .
Alternatively controllers can be self developed using micro-
controller development boards/single board computers [7],
or virtualised using protocol libraries for communications
between the Field Zone [83] and the Management Zone [9].
Management Zone: Data aggregation from all controllers
can be centralised for supervision, monitoring, and logging
purposes within this zone. Traditionally, this is developed
as a supervisory server [113] with direct network access to
controllers and a historian server [25]. Additional engineering
workstations [26], HMIs, and backup servers may also feature
in this zone dependent upon operational requirements. Su-
pervision servers are often proprietary, this can lead to wider
compatibility issues. To address this issue, and to better unify
BMSs, Tridium’s Niagara Fox [114] uses add-ons (drivers)
to communicate with a broad range of vendor devices using
both open-source and proprietary protocols.
5.5.3 IoT
The Internet of Things (IoT) is vastly heterogeneous [3],
with devices and solutions being developed and deployed for
seemingly every conceivable application [5]. There are many
different architectures available for IoT, however for the
purposes of implementation within the Experimental Layer,
the following commonly utilised 3-tiered architecture [12] is
used to separate and guide relevant discussion: Perception
Zone, Network Zone, and Application Zone.
Perception Zone: This zone consists of devices used to
sense and interact with their surrounding environments.
Physical devices can be procured from leading vendors
including Yale [126], or can be self developed using open
source kits [77]. Commercial simulation options are also
available [4].
Network Zone: IoT devices use a variety of network
protocols. Devices that are computationally constrained
use bespoke protocols [104], compared to gateways and
less computationally constrained devices operating over
standardised/conventional protocols [49]. There exist both
commercial [98] and open source [78] solutions supporting a
variety of IoT communication protocols. Simulation of these
is also made possible through commercial products [109] and
programming libraries [82].
Application Zone: This zone contains traditional and non-
traditional devices aggregating and utilising generated data.
Implementations available within this zone vary greatly, and
are largely depend on the given application area. For example,
there are both commercial [92] and open source [76] solu-
tions available for home automation. In-house development
of IoT solutions within this space is achievable, with libraries
available to support communication using related IoT proto-
cols [60]. Virtual application development and testing is also
available commercially [46].
5.5.4 SOC
The Security Operations Centre (SOC), within the Experi-
mental Layer, is intended to support attack detection, cen-
tralised security monitoring, and analysis during experimen-
tation. Data ingested and analysed by the SOC can be split
into two domains, endpoint and network. Endpoint data is
captured from desktop and server based systems throughout
the Experimental Layer via the use of installed agents, con-
figured to feed back crucial information such as processes,
communications, and user logins to the SOC’s server. There
are numerous options for endpoint monitoring and detection,
such as AT&T’s AlienVault Unified Security Management [8].
The inclusion of network data into the SOC allows for a more
holistic view, and provides better coverage over devices on
which endpoint agents cannot be installed. Network traffic,
captured from network mirrors/spans in the Experimental
Layer (see Section 5.3.5), can be fed into the existing SOC
server to be parsed. However, one may have more success
passing the network traffic to specialised devices capable of
ICS, BMS, and IoT protocol recognition [14].
5.6 Layer Agnostic
Systems built with a diverse toolset can be deployed across
multiple testbed layers to perform a range of tasks, from main-
tenance to experimentation. For example, a Kali Linux [96]
system can provide adversary simulation in the Experimen-
tal Layer, capture and analyse network traffic in the User
Layer, and undertake routine offensive security testing of the
testbed’s own defences in the Management Layer. Access
to ICS device configuration/programming software across
testbed layers may also form a key requirement, and where
licenses are tied to a single system, continued re-deployment
of systems between layers becomes critical.
6 Living Resource
The previous sections have taken our high-level model and
transformed it first into a set of building blocks (Figure 2),
then baseline practical implementation guidance. While this
provides a starting point for those looking to build/enhance
their own testbed environments, due to page limitations it
becomes infeasible to detail all options towards the practical
development of a testbed. Furthermore, as a publication ages
over time, the relevance and value of its associated practical
guidance is devalued.
Using our model and the initially proposed set of con-
stituent building blocks, Section 5’s baseline implementa-
tion guidance set provides a clear foundational structure onto
which additional information can be added over time. We
therefore present the concept of an online "living" resource
for ICS testbed development, currently hosted publicly on
GitHub [57]. This resource is currently presented as a web
page and is structured in alignment to Section 5, including
introductory definitions of the model and its associated layers.
Taking the practical guidance from Section 5 as a base, we
have added additional details and references based on our
own research and experience in testbed development. This
demonstrates added value brought to the security community
through a potentially limitless living resource, which has the
ability to grow and evolve over time.
While the current living resource offers additional value in
its current form, it is based on the research and experience of
those within the Security Lancaster research institute. This
presents a limiting factor. To overcome this limitation, we aim
to build an open information sharing community to support
its continued development. Initially, this will be through a
dedicated mailbox to which other testbed owners can sub-
mit suggestions for new building blocks across each layer
(an extension of Figure 2), and/or accompanying practical
implementation guidance.
Security Lancaster is in the process of deploying TIDE-H
(Threat Intelligence Data Exchange Hub) [58]. TIDE-H will
act as a central repository for datasets spanning a range of
security themes, one of which ties directly to ICSs, making
it an ideal platform for a more interactive community to be
housed (beyond a simple mailbox). Furthermore, it allows for
the integration and sharing of additional ICS testbed artefacts
(configuration files, network traffic captures, tooling, etc.).
The formation of TIDE-H also enables broader integration
with other information sharing hubs, such as SEARCCH (due
to launch in Summer 2020) [95], thus supporting the growth
of a broader community-driven space within the context of
cyber security research.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
ICS testbeds are fast becoming an essential tool for the in-
depth exploration of cyber security challenges towards the
protection of CNI. As an extension of existing work in this
space, we have introduced a flexible high-level model used
to support the design and development of ICS testbeds, ac-
companied by baseline practical implementation options. Col-
lectively we have provided a set of building blocks the cyber
security community can adopt to shape their own testbed
environments.
In aligning discussions to our proposed model, we have
illustrated its non-prescriptive application, similar to the Pur-
due model in real world deployments. Acting as a supporting
structure, our model can be built upon based on end-user
requirements. To further the value of our model and base-
line practical implementation options, we have established an
online living resource, initially offering additional practical
implementation options based on our own research and experi-
ence within this field. This resource forms the foundations of
a community-driven effort, where additional building blocks
can be added to our high-level model, along with associated
practical implementation guidance.
Since the creation of our model, we have rebuilt Lancaster
University’s ICS testbed to support each layer. This has im-
proved the usability of our testbed, with lower barriers to
entry for new users, and enabled a broader set of concurrent
research activities to be undertaken. In addition, we are us-
ing the model to support testbed design for industry-driven
product evaluation activities.
Future work will look to port our initial living online re-
source into the TIDE-H platform. Our vision is that this liv-
ing resource provides a foundation towards the creation of a
community-driven, evolving implementation guide, but more
than that, allows for additional testbed artefacts and data repos-
itories to be shared within the community. Furthermore, with
community support comes the ability to further validate our
model across a range of application domains.
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